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The Sui Generis Infallible Sniffing Dog And Other Legal Fictions:
Illinois v. Caballes
By Jerry E. Norton*
Every frequent reader of judicial opinions
has had the experience. Reading an opinion,
one is struck by the unreality of the discourse. It
is as though Doctor Pangloss, Voltaire's character from his tale Candide, is writing his declamation "all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds."
Contrary evidence, although
present, is categorically rejected.
Reading the Supreme Court's decision in
Illinois v Caballes, released January 24, 2005,
provokes just such a Pangloss comparison. In
Caballes, a majority of the Court reaffirmed its
conclusion that an intrusive investigative technique is not a "search" and is therefore outside
the protection of the Fourth Amendment. The
Court based its conclusion solely on its faith that
the technique exposes only contraband, never
innocent private information. The Court refused
to consider evidence that the technique is in fact
flawed. It refused to consider the evidence
because 20 years earlier it concluded without
either evidence or argument that the technique
was reliable.

ond Illinois State Trooper, assigned to the
Illinois State Police Drug Interdiction Team,
overheard these radio transmissions and told
the dispatcher that he was going to the scene of
the stop to conduct a canine sniff.
Meanwhile, the stopping officer concluded that he had no basis for further investigation,
so he started writing a warning ticket. However,
he permitted himself to be distracted by a radio
call on an unrelated matter, so that he was still
writing the ticket when the canine unit arrived.
The officer walked a drug-detection dog around
Caballes' car, and the dog "alerted" at the car
trunk.
The stopping officer opened and
searched the car trunk, finding marijuana.
Caballes was charged with cannabis trafficking.
He moved to suppress the cannabis found in
the trunk of his car, but his motion was denied.
The appellate court affirmed.
The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed,3
holding that marijuana found in the trunk of
Caballes' car was obtained in violation of the
Fourth

"A canine sniff by a weli-trainednarcoticsAmendment
R o y detection dog is 'sui generts'b ecause it 'discloses only
the as applied
Cabafles'
iby the
journey to
presence or absence of n rco tics, a contraband item.
U n i t e d

the United
States
Supreme
Court began on Interstate 80 in LaSalle County,
Illinois, in November 1998.2 An Illinois State
Police Trooper stopped Caballes for driving six
miles over the posted 65 miles per hour speed
limit. The trooper requested of the dispatcher a
confirmation of Caballes' driver's license and
information on his prior criminal record. The
dispatcher reported that Caballes had two prior
arrests for marijuana distribution. The trooper
asked Caballes for permission to search the
trunk of his car, which Caballes refused. A sec-

States

Justice John Paul Stevens S u p r e m e
Court
in

Tery v Ohio.4 In reaching the conclusion that
the search exceeded that allowed in Terry, the
Illinois Court relied on a principle it had more
fully explored in its 2002 decision in People v.
Cox.5 As restated in Caballes, the principle is
that, in assessing the reasonableness of a stop,
not only the justification at its inception must be
considered, but also the court should consider
"(2) 'whether it was reasonably related in scope
to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.' "6 Of its ruling in Cox,
Dog, continued on page 12
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Dog, continued from page 11

the Illinois court said, "We emphasized that the

sniff was impermissible without 'specific and
articulable facts' to support the stopping officer's

request for the canine unit."7

While the stop-

ping officer in Caballes did not request the
canine unit as in Cox, the Illinois Supreme Court
believed that "the overall effect remains the
same. As in Cox, the police impermissibly
broadened the scope of the traffic stop in this
case into a drug investigation . . ."8 Thus the
Illinois Supreme Court ruled that whenever a

minimally intrusive highway stop is expanded
into a full drug-sniffing dog investigation, there
must be some reasonable basis for that expansion.

The United States Supreme Court
reversed the decision of
the Illinois Supreme Court.
Speaking for the majority
of the Court in a very brief
opinion, Justice Stevens
ignored the Terry basis for

the Illinois Court decision.
It relied instead on a 1983
Supreme Court decision,
United States v. Place,
holding that a dog sniff is
not a search and therefore

not subject to the Fourth

ment."12 The majority agreed with the Illinois
Supreme Court's Cox decision in one regard. "A
seizure that is justified solely by the interest in
issuing a warning ticket to the driver can
become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the
time reasonably required to complete that mission."3 Time, however, seemed to be the only
factor Justice Stevens would consider.
At this point the Caballes decision may
simply be explained as a reaffirmation of a 20year-old precedent. But that precedent, United
States v. Place, is itself a questionable decision.
In Place, a narcotics dog sniffed luggage at
Kennedy Airport. The Supreme Court held,
however, that the evidence should have been
suppressed The ruling of the Supreme Court
was that the retention of the
luggage for more than 90
minutes exceeded that permissible in a Terry stop.14

Thus, the Court found that it
exceeded the scope of
Terry, the point that the
Illinois Supreme Court used
in deciding Caballes!
However, the majority in Place went on to rule
that a canine sniff is not a
"search."15 Since the issue
in Place was the detention
of the luggage for 90 min-

or absence of narcotics, a

Justice Blackmun said in his
concurrence, "The Court
has no need to decide the issue here."16 Justice
Brennan agreed and added that the dog sniff
issue was neither briefed nor argued before the
Court in Place. 7
Thus, without either brief or argument,
the Court concluded in 1983 and reaffirmed
without reexamination in 2005 that "a canine
sniff by a well-trained narcotics-detection dog is
'sui generis' because it 'discloses only the pres-

.

Amendment.9 "In [Place]
we treated a canine sniff
by a well-trained narcoticsdetection dog as 'sui
generis' because it 'discloses only the presence
"10
item.'
contraband
"Accordingly, the use of a well-trained narcoticsdetection dog - one that 'does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain
hidden from public view,' . . . during a lawful traffic stop, generally does not implicate legitimate
privacy interests."), Efforts by the Respondent

to argue the unreliability of dog sniffs were summarily turned away. "[T]he record contains no
evidence or findings that support his argu-

utes, the question of the
dog sniff being a search for
Fourth Amendment purposes was purely dictum.

As

Dog, continued on page 13
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Dog, continued from page 12

embarrassment of the law-abiding population."23
ence or absence of narcotics, a contraband
As in Voltaire's Candide, the majority of
item.' "18 The Respondent in Caballes tried to
challenge the conclusion that dog sniffs are as
the Court apparently accepts the belief that
reliable as the majority seems to assume. If
police dogs will detect contraband, and only
these dogs are not particularly reliable, the
contraband, as an article of faith, as Pangloss
"alerts" may be caused by private sources other
accepted his fate in "the best of all possible
than contraband.
Dissenting in Caballes,
worlds." As Pangloss might have put it, "A sniffJustice Souter said, "What we have learned
ing dog is reliable because the Court would not
about the fallibility of dogs in the years since
have said it is if it were not true. Evidence is
cessary."24 Surely subjecting peoPlace was decided would itself be reapie t ) the degradation of having their
son to call for reconsidering Place's
decision against treating the intention- "Wha t we have persc ns and property targeted for obvial use of a trained dog as a search."19 learnec d about the Ous public humiliation deserves more
After a review of cases, he concludes fallibil
than just an uncritical citation to dictum
ity
of
dogs
of
a
creature
in a n earlier case, unsupported by
.
.
.
is
dog
"The infallible
legal fiction."2o He argues that, if the in the y ears since eithe r briefs or arguments.
Court is to be consistent in saying that Place was decidThe uninvited attention of dogs
a dog sniff is not a search, then the
was obviously degrading and cruel in
ld
itself
be
the photographs we saw of Abu Ghraib
Fourth Amendment will have nothing edwou
to do with the police use of them. reason to callfor priso n. Narcotic-detection dogs are
Police dogs could be indiscriminately
recon sidering not d egrading to the same degree, but
used to sweep cars on the street, in
they are not such minimal intrusions on
decision
s
thed ignity and the legitimate privacy
lots
or
stopped
at
traffic
lights
Place'
parking
again st treating inter 3sts of the individual that we
and even pedestrians on sidewalks.
Justice Souter also joined in a the in tentional shoulld simply ignore the possibility that
separate dissent written by Justice
are not reliable enough in every
they
trained
a
Of
In this dissent, Justice
Ginsburg.
settin g to justify the cost in human digGinsburg returned to the argument dog as a search." nity. At least, the potential issues of
raised by the Illinois Court. The quesdigni ty and privacy merit a more contion isn't only whether or not a dog Justice )avid Souter scien tious review of the Fourth
A ma idment issues than the Supreme
sniff is a search, but also whether subjecting a motorist to these dogs impermissibly
Court gave us in Illinois v. Caballes or United
broadens the scope of the traffic stop under
States v. Place.
Terry v. Ohio. And in assessing the scope of the
* Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago.
stop, time is not the only issue. "In applying
1. Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834 (2005).
Terry, the Court has several times indicated that
2. This factual background is drawn from the decision of
the limitation on 'scope' is not confined to the
the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Caballes, 207 Ill.
duration of the seizure; it also encompasses the
2d 504, 802 N.E.2d 202 (2003).
manner in which the seizure is conducted"21
3. Id.
She agreed with the Illinois Supreme Court that
4. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
the use of dogs might fail the second Terry
5. People v. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d 462, 782 N.E.2d 275 (2002).
inquiry. "Even if the drug sniff is not character6. People v. Caballes, supra n.2, 207 Ill. 2d at 508, N.E.2d
ized as a Fourth Amendment 'search' . . ., the
at 204.
sniff surely broadened the scope of the traffic7. Id. at 509
violation-related seizure."22
"Under today's
8. Id. at 510; Cox, 202 Ill. 2d at 472. In both the Cox and
the Caballes cases, Justice Thomas filed dissenting opindecision, every traffic stop could become an
ions in which he spoke for three of the seven Illinois
occasion to call in the dogs, to the distress and
Dog, continued on page 14
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Supreme Court members.
9. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).

10. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 838.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.
(1984).
14. Place, 462 U.S. at 709-710.
15. Id. at 707.
16. Id. at 723 (Blackmun, H. concurring).
17. Id. at 710 (Brennan, J. concurring).
18. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 838.
19. Id. at 839. (Souter, D. dissenting).
20. Id.
21. Id. (Ginsburg, R. dissenting).
22. Id.
23. Id.

109

24. "Well, my dear Pangloss," said Candide to him,
"when you were hanged, dissected, severely beaten, and
tugging at the oar in the galley, did you always think that
things in this world were for the best?"
"I am still of my first opinion," answered Pangloss; "for
as I am a philosopher, it would be inconsistent with my
character to contradict myself; . . ..
Voltaire, Candide, Chapter XXVIll.

The Debate Over Consumer Arbitration Clauses
By Emily Rozwadowski
Predispute arbitration clauses are often
used by businesses in contracts with other
businesses. These clauses require the parties
to settle disputes in arbitration rather than in
court. However, these clauses are now being
added by businesses into their contracts with
consumers. These clauses also require consumers to settle disputes in arbitration. In addition, the clauses often preclude consumers
from bringing class action lawsuits.
Proponents of arbitration say there are
many advantages to the system. Arbitrations
are kept confidential, are governed by a national set of procedures, and require limited discovery. Proponents argue that predispute arbitration clauses are not necessarily unfair to
consumers. Arbitration lowers a business's
costs and these costs will be passed on to
other consumers.
The use of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts, however, is controversial.
Opponents of arbitration clauses in consumer
contracts say that the high cost of arbitration
may prevent consumers from seeking redress.
In addition, many clauses preclude class action
suits, which opponents say is harmful to con-

surmers.
"In general, I believe mandatory arbitration clauses are unfair," said Jean Sternlight,
Saltman Professor, University of Nevada-Las
Vegas, Boyd School of Law, and director,
Saltman Center for Conflict Resolution.
"People haven't entered into them in a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent way."
Sternlight argues that arbitration clauses are harmful to consumers because they are
imposed on consumers without the consumers' consent. "Because of the way the
clauses are imposed, companies can construct them in a way that is beneficial to them,"
Sternlight said.
Professor Mark Budnitz, a law professor at Georgia State University College of
Law, also believes arbitration clauses in consumer contracts are unfair because arbitrators
are not required to follow consumer protection
laws, there is no jury trial, and there is no way
for the consumer to appeal the award. Budnitz
also believes the clauses are unfair because
arbitration proceedings are kept private.
"Companies can hide their misdeeds
because arbitration proceedings are secret,"
Arbitration, continued on page 15
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